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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
KENNETH RASMUSSEN and \ 
FAUN RASMUSSEN, I 
Plaintiffs and Appellants, / 
— vs.— > No. 4218 
NEAL O. DAVIS and DORA S. I 
DAVIS, ) 
Defendants and Respondents. / 
PETITION FOR REHEARING AND 
BRIEF IN SUPPORT THEREOF 
TO THE HONORABLE CHIEF JUSTICE AND AS-
SOCIATE JUSTICES OF THE SUPREME COURT 
OF UTAH: 
Come now the plaintiffs and appellants in the above 
entitled cause and respectfully petition this court to 
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2 
grant a rehearing in the above entitled cause upon the 
following grounds: 
1. That the majority opinion of this court is in 
error in holding that all question of the forfeiture of the 
rights of the plaintiffs and appellants under the original 
contract between plaintiffs and defendants have become 
moot. 
2. That the majority opinion of this court is in 
error by in effect holding that plaintiffs having consented 
to a rescission of a part of the original contract between 
plaintiffs and defendants are precluded from maintain-
ing this action. 
3. That the majority opinion of this court is in error 
in holding that plaintiffs have waived their right to rely 
on the' error of the trial court in refusing to permit the 
defendant Faun Easmussen to testify that the defendant 
Kenneth Easmussen told her that when they vacated the 
property which they agreed to purchase, they were not 
releasing their right to part of the $8000.00 down pay-
ment, 
4. That the majority opinion of this court is in 
error by in effect holding that Mrs. Easmussen is pre-
cluded from claiming a part of the down payment of 
$8,000.00. 
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5. The majority opinion of this court is in error 
in holding that the plaintiffs did not establish a jury 
case as to deceit. 
Kespectfully submitted, 
DON MACK DALTON 
ELIAS HANSEN 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs and 
Appellants. 
STATE OF UTAH 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE 
We, Don Mack Dalton and Elias Hansen, each here-
by certify that the foregoing petition for a rehearing is 
not filed for the purpose of delay and that each of us is 
of the opinion that there is merit to the foregoing peti-
tion. 
Eespectfully submitted, 
DON MACK DALTON 
ELIAS HASEN 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs and 
Appellants. 
AEGUMENT 
At the outset we find the authorities are all to the 
effect that before a contract can be rescinded, it is neces-
sary that all of the parties must consent to the rescission 
ss. 
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except, of course, a court may decree a rescission and 
the parties may abandon a contract. 
So also the authorities are all to the effect that 
a contract may be rescinded or "terminated by virtue of 
a contractual provision therefor, and rescission for ori-
ginal invalidity, failure of consideration, material 
breach." Generally when a contract is rescinded there is 
a right of restitution. 12 Am. Jur., page 1010, Sec. 430, 
et seq. and cases cited in foot notes. 
In this case the contract between the parties was 
rescinded if at all by the agreement of the parties. There 
is neither pleading nor evidence of any other rescission 
unless it be that defendants rescinded the contract be-
cause of a breach thereof by plaintiffs in failing 
to make the payment of the installment of $5000.00 which 
became due on January 1,1952. 
I t is said in 12 Am. Jur . 1011 that 
"Persons competent to contract can as valid-
ly agree to rescind a contract already made as 
they could agree to make it originally. However 
to have the effect of discharging a contract an 
agreement of rescission must be a valid agree-
ment. Two minds are required to change the terms 
and conditions of a contract after it is executed. 
As a contract is made by the joint will of two par-
ties, it can be rescinded only by the joint will of 
two parties. I t is obvious that one of the parties 
can no more rescind the contract without the 
others express or implied assent than he alone can 
make it." 
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The law just quoted is so elementary that we re-
frain from reviewing the numerous cases cited in the 
foot notes to the text, however, we have read a number 
of such cases am! needless to say, they support the text. 
With these fundamental principles of law as a back-
ground, let us examine the holdings of the majority opin-
ion of the court that we claim are erroneous. 
POINT ONE \ NT) POINT T l rO 
THE MAJORITY OPINION OF THIS rOi'KT IS IN 
ERROR IN THAT IT IS HELD THAT: ALL QUESTIONS 
OF THE FORFEITURE OF THE RIGHTS OF THE PLAIN-
TIFFS AND APPELLANTS UNDER THE ORIGINAL CON-
TRACT BETWEEN THE PLAINTIFFS AND DEFENDANTS 
HAVE BECOME MOOT, AND SUCH MAJORITY OPINION 
IS IN ERROR BY IN EFFECT HOLDING THAT PLAIN-
TIFFS HAVE CONSENTED TO A RESCISSION OF A PART 
OF THE ORIGINAL CONTRACT BETWEEN PLAINTIFFS 
AND DEFENDANTS ARE PRECLUDED FROM MAINTAIN-
ING THIS ACTION, 
The particulars in which appellants and plaintiffs 
claim the majority opinion of this court is in error as to 
the first and second grounds upon which they seek a 
rehearing are so similar and so interwoven that they can 
best be discussed together and therefore we shall so dis-
cuss them. 
It is correctly stated in the dissenting opinion that 
the majority opinion is bottomed on •![<< erroneous con-
ception that the parties got together and made a so-called 
rescission of the entire agreement. The evidence \< all 
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to the effect that plaintiff, Kenneth Kasmussen, and de-
fendant, Neal G. Davis, were not able to agree upon what 
should be done about the down payment of $8000.00. If 
there is doubt about that being the testimony of both of 
the plaintiffs and appellants the attention of the court 
is directed to the following pages of the Transcript: 25-
27, 42, 100, 112, 113, 117, 136, 138, 139, 141, 182-185. 
The evidence also shows that defendant, Neal G. Davis, 
repeatedly said uif you don't get off or if you stop this 
sale, it will cost you a lot more than $8000.00." (Tr. 112, 
114). 
It will be seen from the foregoing testimony that the 
plaintiff, Kenneth Easmussen, not once but upon nu-
merous occasions testified that while he and defendant, 
Neal G. Davis, agreed upon the rescission of the original 
contract between plaintiffs and defendants in a number 
of particulars, they could not and did not agree as to 
what should be done with the down payment of $8000.00. 
About that being the evidence, there would seem to be 
no possibility of any difference of opinion. The defend-
ant, Neal G. Davis, and plaintiff, Kenneth Easmussen, 
having been unable to agree upon what should be done 
with the $8000.00, it necessarily follows that resort must 
be had to some method of disposing of the question of 
what should be done with the $8000.00. 
In the testimony of Mr. Easmussen, above referred 
to, it is made clear not only that he did not and would 
not consent to defendants retaining all of the $8000.00 
but he also testified that it was agreed that "We were 
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going to turn it to our lawyers to finish on this $8000.00." 
(Tr. 42). I t by no means follows that because the defend-
ant, Davis, refused to voluntarily return part of the $8,-
000.00 he was not willing to submit the matter to arbitra-
tion. If, as seems obvious, the provisions of the contract, 
Exhibit A, which authorizes the defendants to retain not 
only the down payment of $8000.00, but also the note and 
mortgage for $5000.00 in the event of any breach of the 
original contract, no matter how slight, is against public 
policy. Such provision is a much more glaring penalty 
than that condemned by the Court in the case of Perkins 
et al v. Spencer, 243 Pac. (2d) 446. I t is inconceivable 
that the Davises could suffer a loss of $13000.00 because 
of any breach of the original contract dated March 15, 
1951 or January 2,1952 when the $5000.00 note and mort-
gage became due. 
The law dealing with a state of facts such as are 
here present is thus stated in 11 Am. Jur . 256: 
"Whatever may be the law as to cases involv-
ing no question of illegality, it is very clear that 
the general rule as to the effect of a compromise 
can have no application where the claim involved 
therein was wholly based upon an unlawful as 
distinguished from merely insufficient considera-
tion. This universal acknowledged rule is not 
based upon any appreciative regard for the party 
against whom the relief is sought, and who will 
be benefited by the refusal of the court to grant 
the same, but upon grounds of sound public policy. 
Any contract executed in consideration of a pre-
vious illegal one, or in compromise of differences 
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growing out of it is generally speaking like that 
whereon it rests, illegal and incapable of being 
enforced." 
The authorities go further and hold that unconscion-
able compromises will be relieved against by courts of 
equity. 11 Am. Jur . 278. Cases in support of that text 
will be found in foot notes. Needless to say a claim based 
upon a provision of a contract that is a penalty and as 
such unenforceable is a typical illegal claim. In the case 
of Union Collection Co. v. Buckman, 150 Cal. 159, 88 Pac. 
708, cited in the foot note to the text above quoted will be 
found collected a number of cases and authorities from 
which it will be seen that the doctrine announced in the 
text is of general if not uniform application. While most 
of the cited cases deal with gambling contracts, the doc-
trine as will be seen from the authorities is not limited 
to such cases. 
Under the principles announced in the foregoing 
authorities it may, to say the least, be doubted if, under 
the facts shown by the evidence in this case, the plain-
tiffs had consented to forego their right to have returned 
to them a par t of the $8000.00, such a compromise would 
have been enforceable. In this case, as the evidence 
shows, the defendant, Davis, stated that he had a sale 
for the property and unless Mr. Easmussen surrendered 
up the property, he would be sued and it would cost him 
more than the $8000.00 which had been paid down on the 
property. I t will be seen from the text and the cases cited 
in support thereof in 11 Am. Jur . 278 that courts of 
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equity will grant relief against unconscionable compro-
mises on the grounds of presumptive fraud even if there 
is no actual fraud. That being so for much stronger rea-
sons are the plaintiffs in this case entitled to relief where 
they at no time agreed to relinquish their claim to the 
$8000.00, the savings of a lifetime, as a part of the trans-
action whereby the contract was terminated. 
I t certainly is as much against public policy to make 
it possible to retain a penalty by threats as it is against 
public policy to seek unjust enrichment by contract. 
POINT THREE 
THE MAJORITY OPINION OF THIS COURT IS IN 
ERROR IN HOLDING THAT PLAINTIFFS HAVE WAIVED 
THEIR RIGHT TO RELY ON THE ERROR OF THE TRIAL 
COURT IN REFUSING TO PERMIT PLAINTIFF, FAUN RAS-
MUSSEN, TO TESTIFY THAT THE DEFENDANT, KEN-
NETH RASMUSSSEN, TOLD HER THAT WHEN THEY VA-
CATED THE PROPERTY, WHICH THEY AGREED TO 
PURCHASE, THEY WERE NOT RELEASING THEIR RIGHT 
TO PART OF THE $8,000.00 DOWN PAYMENT. 
The proceedings had before the court at the time the 
plaintiff, Faun Rasmussen, was asked the question as 
to the conversation had with her husband about what was 
to become of the $8000.00 down payment will be found 
on pages 182-185 of the Transcript. Mrs. Rasmussen was 
asked this question: "Was anything said by your hus-
band as to the matter of the $8000.00?" (Tr. 182). A. 
"Yes Sir." The Court: "If there is no objection, I will 
let her testify, if there is, I won't," 
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At the suggestion of the Court, counsel for the de-
fendant stated: "If I had any idea what her answer would 
be, I don't know whether we would object or not. We 
think it is incompetent." (Tr. 183). 
The record further shows that the question of the 
admissibility of this proferred evidence was argued be-
fore the Court (E. 184). While the argument is not 
reported, the only reasonable conclusion is that the pur-
poses for which the evidence was offered was presented 
to the court. There is no doubt but that the evidence 
is hearsay, and it is extremely unlikely that anyone would 
argue that the evidence was admissible for any other 
purposeTIian to show one of the facts thatinduced Mrs. 
Easmussen to consent to vacate the p r e m i s e ^ J i is true 
that when, in the absence of the jury, counsel for plain-
tiffs stated what he proposed to show by the testimony 
of Mrs. Easmussen, nothing further was said about the 
limited purpose for which such testimony was offered, 
but the Court having theretofore, in the argument had 
before him, been full advised as to the purpose of the 
evidence, it would have been idle to have again informed 
the court of the purpose of the offer where there could 
have been no other possible grounds upon which such 
evidence was competent. 
It will further be noted that immediately following 
the ruling of the court, Mrs. Easmussen testified that at 
no time at or prior to the time she moved off the Davis 
property did she have any information or know that the 
$8000.00 was to go to Mr. Davis. (Tr. 185). 
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It is said on page 2 of the opinion that no proffer 
was made under any exceptions to the hearsay rule and 
any error, therefore, was waived. In support of such 
holding there is cited Wigmore, Evidence Vol. 1 Sec. 
18b, page 321. An examination of Wigmore on Evidence 
shows that the cited page must be in error because the 
subject matter referred to in the opinion is not there 
discussed. Section 18b does discuss the question of the 
waiver of errors in the rejection of evidence where the 
one offering the evidence does something thereafter 
which may be said to constitute a waiver. Under the old 
rules a failure to take exception to the ruling of the court 
constituted a waiver, but, of course, such rule has long 
since ceased to exist in this jurisdiction. 
POINT FOUR 
THAT THE MAJORITY OPINION OF THIS COURT IS 
IN ERROR BY IN EFFECT HOLDING THAT MRS. RAS-
MUSSEN IS PRECLUDED FROM CLAIMING A PART OF 
THE DOWN PAYMENT OF $8000.00. 
As will be seen from the statement of the law in 12 
Am. Jur. Sec. 431, page 1011 and the cases there cited, 
the law is all to the effect that a contract cannot be res-
cinded without the express or implied assent of all of the 
parties thereto. So far as we are able to ascertain that is 
the uniform holding of the courts. In this case the evi-
dence is all to the effect that Mrs. Rasmussen never con-
sented to release any claim that she had to the $8000.00 
down payment. She stated that she did not so consent. 
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Moreover, it is made apparent from the testimony of 
Mrs. Easmussen that the defendant, Neal Gr. Davis, de-
liberately saw to it that Mrs. Easmussen should not be 
informed of the terms upon which the original contract 
was terminated. 
After the property had been returned to Mr. Davis, 
some men appeared at the Easmussen home in Ephraim 
and called Mr. Easmussen out of his home and there had 
a conversation with him about the terms upon which he 
agreed to surrender up the possession of the property. 
(Tr. 186, 187). About fifteen minutes after these men 
sought to secure admission from Mr. Easmussen, they 
were seen in the presence of the defendant, Neal Gr. 
Davis. (Tr. 187). The only reasonable inference that can 
be drawn from that testimony is that Mr. Davis had at 
least grave doubts about being able to show that Mr. 
Easmussen had agreed to surrender all interest in the 
$8000.00 and that he did not want Mrs. Easmussen to 
know anything about the terms of the deal that defend-
ant, Neal Gr. Davis, claims to have made with Mr. Eas-
mussen touching the surrender of the possession of the 
property that plaintiffs had agreed to purchase. 
In the light of this behaviour of the defendant, Neal 
Gr. Davis, together with the uncontradicted evidence, it is 
quite apparent that if the majority opinion of this court 
is permitted to become the established law of this case, 
Mrs. Easmussen will be deprived of her interest in the 
contract and particularly the $8000.00 without her con-
sent and against her will. To so hold requires turning 
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the clock back for two or more centuries. If, in this case, 
the dealing had with Mr. Easmnssen had been had with 
Mrs. Easmnssen, we believe no one would contend that 
Mrs. Easmnssen would be bound by such dealings. As we 
understand the modern law in this jurisdiction, a husband 
has no greater right to dispose of the property rights 
of his wife than does a wife have to dispose of the rights 
of the husband. Certainly so far as Mrs. Easmussen 
is concerned the defendant, Neal G. Davis, is seeking 
to rescind or terminate the original contract without the 
consent and against the will of Mrs. Easmussen. That 
being so, the rights of the parties should be determined 
by the general law applicable to the rescission of con-
tracts, namely, the parties should, so far as may be 
placed in status quo. 
POINT FIVE 
THE MAJORITY OPINION OF THIS COURT IS IN 
ERROR IN HOLDING THAT THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT 
ERR IN CONCLUDING THAT PLAINTIFFS DID NOT ES-
TABLISH A JURY CASE IN DECEIT. 
It is true that the plaintiffs did not produce testi-
mony as to the extent of the damages sustained by them 
because of the false representation of the defendant, Neal 
G. Davis during the negotiations leading up to the exe-
cution of the contract. To have done so would have been 
of no avail. It will be seen at the beginning of the trial 
that defendants so contended. (Tr. 3-4). Obviously the 
plaintiffs could not recover damages when by their plead-
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ings they claim the contract was rescinded or cancelled. 
The authorities teach that when a contract is rescinded 
there can be no award of damages. 12 Am. Jur . Sec. 455, 
page 1038 and cases there cited. 
However, the fact that the defendants falsely mis-
represented the facts is material to show that the plain-
tiffs acted in good faith in seeking some redress for the 
wrong perpetrated upon them, that is sought a cancella-
tion joL_the contract. That false statements were made 
by the defendants in the course of the negotiations which_ 
e ^ ^ p t o the execution of Jh£_contract is ampl}^ borng-
by the testimony. (Tr. 8,15,18,177). 
# 
A . D ^ CONCLUSION 
y r I n conclusion plaintiffs urge that a rehearing of this 
cause be granted to the end that : 
(a) This Court determine that the provisions of 
the original contract providing for the forfeiture of the 
down payment of $8000.00 and the note secured by a 
Chattel Mortgage for the sum of $5000.00 payable on 
January 2, 1952 be declared invalid because of an uncon-
scionable penalty and that such provision was not and 
could not be rendered valid and binding upon the plain-
tiffs under the facts disclosed by the record in this case. 
(b) That plaintiff, Mrs. Easmussen, was not and 
could not be deprived of her interest in the $8000.00 down 
payment without her knowledge or consent and grevious 
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error was committed by the majority opinion of this court 
in holding that she has been deprived of such right. 
(c) That the court re-examine the record in this 
case in light of the authorities cited herein and particu-
larly from the point of view that the conversations had 
by the plaintiff, Mr. Rasinussen, and Mr. Davis did not 
and could not lawfully constitute a ratification of the pro-
vision in the original contract that the defendants might 
retain the $8000.00 down payment as liquidated damages 
and particularly as to the right of the plaintiff, Faun 
Rasmussen. 
Respectfully submitted, 
DON MACK DALTON 
ELIAS HANSEN 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs and 
Appellants. 
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